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(AppeHant) with trespass. Appellant

2008,

second trespass was filed

and

charges against

Appellant were dismissed by the prosecutor. In the third instance, the matter was resolved

July

of2013 when Appellant was acquitted of the charge following a bench trial. Following the
acquittal, Appellant filed this lawsuit naming the Respondents and alleging various § 1983 and
state law tort claims.

District Court granted summary judgment dismissing all of Appellants

claims on December 31, 2015.

B. Course of Proceedings:
Appellant filed her prose Complaint on September 16, 201
to dismiss pursuant to Idaho Code§ 6-610 on October 23, 2015.

Respondents filed a motion
§ 6-610 motion was heard

on November 16, 2015. The District Court granted Respondents' motion to dismiss pursuant to§
6-610 on November 20, 2015. Respondent's filed a motion for summary judgment on November
12, 2015. A hearing was held on the motion for summary judgment on December 9, 2015.
District Court granted Respondents' motion for summary judgment and dismissed Appellant's
Complaint with prejudice on December 31, 2015.

Judgment

dismissal was entered by the

District Court on January 13, 2016. Appellant timely filed this appeal on February 4, 2016.

l

during all
to

matter.

was

during all times relevant to this matter. Respondent John Clements was a deputy for the Sheriffs
Office at all times relevant to this matter. Robin
and Amelia Sheets was

was the elected prosecuting attorney

deputy prosecutor during all times relevant to

matter.
3. Appellant filed
matter
occurred

lawsuit on September 16,201

(Complaint, pg.

from three trespass charges

2008, and Appellant pled guilty. (R. 707) The second trespass charge was filed in

2009, and was later dismissed by the prosecutor. (R. 707) The third trespass charge was issued
on August 30, 2011. (R. 707) Appellant was acquitted

trespass

on July

13.

(R. 707).
4. Appellant recounted that on July 24, 2011 she received a call from Bill Shurtliff (a
County) indicating that there were

located on

property

Murdock and Kurt B. Young that were in poor condition. Mr. Shurtliff asked Appellant to go out
and look at them.

2

I

6.

1
" " " "'',..

that

was

was taking pictures of the
was

on

was not

Id. Appellant said that
"Id.

a lot

Young called in a trespass complaint to the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office against Appellant
being on his property without permission. This was the second time during the year that Mr.
had

Jefferson County Sheriffs Office and entered a

trespassing on his property. (R. 489; Dep. Elliott,
against Appellant on April 20, 2011.
7.

approximately

against Mr. Young and

4). Mr. Young had
481 · Dep. Elliott, 1

a trespass
10).

same time, Appellant called in a complaint

animal

Murdoch. Deputy John Clements was assigned to respond to

complaints. Deputy Clements first responded to Mr. Young's residence.
investigation.

about Appellant

spoke with

Young,

a standard

Murdoch and other witnesses including Klurissa

Young. He had the witnesses fill out witness statements. He went to Mr. Murdock's property and
investigated the animal abuse complaint. He took photographs of the horses and of the property.
Young,
the photographs demonstrated that Appellant had been trespassing on his ground. Mr. Young
then signed a citizen "trespass" complaint against Appellant. (R. 4 76; Dep. Elliott, 69-71 ).

a camera

1s on

car

9.

and spoke with Appellant and

husband regarding
Appellant of the incident. (R. 476; Dep. Elliott, 71:9-10)

10.

After Deputy Clements gathered the information regarding the two complaints

lodged with the Sheriff's

on

Jefferson County Prosecutor's office. (R.
11.

2011, he turned all of the

,n+,,.,.,.,,,,"',v"',+>u~·u

over to the

Aff Clements, ,r 5)

The elected prosecutor for

County at the

was Robin Dunn.

Dunn assigned his deputy Amelia Sheets to handle the incidents. (R. 459; AjJ. Sheets,

,r

480; Dep. Elliott, 91 :9-13) Mr. Dunn has explained that he assigned Ms. Sheets to handle the
case,

that he was not personally involved in the day-to-day prosecution of

Sheets made the charging decision without any input or influence from Mr.

case. Ms.
Dunn

explained that he did not hold any malice or ill-will toward the Appellant. (R. 440; Aff Dunn, ,i
1-5)

determined that there was probable cause to issue a citation for trespass against Appellant. The
probable cause arose from the fact that Appellant had trespassed on Mr. Young's property earlier
in the year, and had returned to Mr. Young's property on July

4

2011. Specifically, Ms. Sheets

that

13.

not act

The decision to charge Appellant was an exercise of Ms. Sheets' judgment

in the course of carrying out

duties as a deputy prosecutor

Jefferson

was not influenced by any
charging decision. (R. 459; Ajf Sheets,
While

Dunn

~

6)

not

case,

It is his professional
probable cause to

a citation for trespass against

statements, photographs and particularly
admission of Mr. Young that Appellant was "on his property. (R.
15.

Ajf Dunn, ,r 5)

Deputy Clements has testified that he did not hold any malice or ill-will toward

Appellant. He has explained that he did not act with deliberate indifference to any

Appellant's

constitutional rights. He has explained that he resn011ae:a to the trespass call according to his
training, he investigated the facts, gathered evidence, and submitted the facts to the Prosecuting
office. (R. 462; Aff. Clements, ,r 4-6)

5

7.
1,
were followed

to his

0 , ~. . ~"'"b

County Sheriffs

all'"'""""'"'"'

1-'~••v»,~

and Deputy Clements. Sheriff

to

was

handling of a trespass calL Sheriff Olsen explained that the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office did
not have any policy that authorized or allowed malicious prosecution. There was no formal
policy or informal practice of authorizing or allowing a deputy to exert improper

over

a charging decision. (R. 436; A.ff Olsen, ,r 3-5).

18.

Sheriff Olsen did not hold any personal ill

against Appellant AH charging decisions in regard to the August 30, 2011
were made by
19.

complaint

Prosecuting Attorney's Office. (R. 436; A.ff Olsen, ,r 6).
Appellant admitted that she did not have any direct evidence that Sheriff

acted with "malice" in regard to her. (R. 485; Dep. Elliott, 195:11-14) Appellant also
acknowledged that she did not have any evidence that Sheriff Olsen had anything to do with the
decision to issue the criminal charge

trespass on August 30, 2011. (R. 485; Dep. Elliott,

193: 14-16)
20.

Though he is named in the Complaint, Commissioner Gerald Raymond did not

have any personal participation in

of the events. He also stated that he had no knowledge of,

6

21.
out
or some

over

Dep. Elliott, 139: 1-7).
Commissioner Raymond has explained that he does not have any
authority over
the

Jefferson County, and that

of the Sheriffs
had a statutory obligation to

23.

each

of

The Sheriff is a separately elected official, and is

ofthe

budget

is not in

budgetary review

department or

supervisory authority over the day-to-day conduct of the Sheriff or

Aff Raymond, ,i
and approve
any
(R. 467;

Raymond, 1 6)
IV.
ARGUMENT
Appellant has filed this appeal listing seven issues (a -g) in her opening brief. This Court
has been unwavering in holding that "[w ]here an appellant fails to assert his assignments of error
with particularity and to support his position with sufficient authority, those assignments of error
are too indefinite to be heard by the

"Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho

7

790, 229 P .3d 1146,

error."
to
compliance with the

extent
it is deemed to be waived. Id.

a final

this

been

that "[p ]ro se litigants are not accorded any special consideration simply because
choose to represent themselves,

v. Sanders, 150 Idaho
342,
standards

1

Idaho

not

from
(201 O); (citing Sammis v. ~Magnetek,

244 P.3d 197,
318 (1997).

941
as

n.uu,,.,,

represented by an

"pro se litigants are

'-'A"""'~] "

to

1

same

(citing

445, 80 P.3d 1043, 1046 (2003)).

Based upon the foregoing case law, Appellant has only appropriately identified one
appeal (whether

District Court erred in granting summary judgment on

malicious prosecution claims). Appellant has not specifically identified any other legal or factual
issue on appeal and has not argued in her brief for reversal of any other factual or legal issue on
appeal.

is not

to

the

on appeal

error." For example, even

though Appellant has attempted to appeal the District Court's grant of summary judgment, she
has not identified which, if any, of the legal rulings in the Order granting summary judgment
she intends to appeal.

general attack on the findings and conclusions of the district

8

DISTRICT COURT
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CLAIM.
it is

to

prosecution" in part (b)
malicious prosecutions"

specific issue on appeal,
"Issues Presented

Appeal" and has alluded to "multiple

paragraph one of her "Argument".

gravamen

the allegations in

Appellant's
prosecution claims, the District Court correctly applied
(which were construed
District Court
prosecution

law to the facts

a light most favorable to Appellant). Following that analysis, the

that summary judgment was appropriate on both
(R. 723) In the "Nature

the Case" portion

that she "appeals the dismissal on summary judgment in

Appellant's malicious
Appellant suggests

1983 Civil Rights claim against

respondents, for their repeated malicious, baseless, and coordinated charges filed against
Appellant and for the failure of the Respondents {Commissioners) to intercede when informed of
the actions against her." Appellant's Brief, pg. 12. Respondents view this as the only issue that
Appellant has appropriately raised on appeal, i.e., the dismissal of her§ 1983 and state law
malicious prosecution claims against the Respondents.

probable cause,

or another specific constitutional right. Lacey v.

purpose of denying

Maricopa Cnty., 693

so

896,919

2012)(citing Freeman v.

of Santa Ana,

1180, 1189 (9th Cir.1995).
In Freeman, the plaintiff alleged that she was subjected to malicious prosecution when
charges were brought against her and later dropped. The 9th Circuit held that "although she
alleges that the defendants acted with intent to deprive her of constitutional rights, Freeman is
unable to show that she was prosecuted without probable cause." Freeman v. City ofSanta Ana,
68 F .3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995), as amended on denial ofreh'g and reh'g en bane (Dec. 29,

1995)(citing Brown v. Selfridge, 224 U.S. 189, 192, 32 S.Ct. 444,446, 56 L.Ed. 727 (1912)
(holding that plaintiff bears the burden of proving malice and lack of probable cause). In

Freeman, the 9th Circuit dismissed the malicious prosecution claim noting that the plaintiff:
merely lists the series of citations that were issued against her and notes that they
were dismissed. However, the mere fact a prosecution was unsuccessful does not
mean it was not supported by probable cause. She does not point to any evidence
indicating that probable cause was lacking. Thus, even if the defendants acted
with the purpose of denying Freeman's constitutional rights, the district court did
not err by directing a verdict on Freeman's malicious prosecution claims.
Id.

The District Court analyzed the § 1983 malicious prosecution claim in conjunction with
the state law malicious prosecution claim, as the facts supporting each claim were the same.

IO

,vas

want

probable cause, and
4

damages were sustained."

85 Idaho 286,

416 (1963).

with favor by the courts. Id.

never been regarded
defense of advice of counsel is equivalent to a showing of

probable cause, and "generally precludes an action for malicious prosecution." Id.
Under these state and federal standards the issue
the charge

is the fundamental analysis.

District

because (as the District Court held)
"'"'"LL"'"

whether there was "probable cause"
properly held that Appellant

was probable cause

trespass

issued in 2011. The District Court separately analyzed the malicious prosecution claims

as they related to
a.

conduct

each Respondent

The District Court correctly held that the malicious prosecution claims
should be dismissed as against Deputy Clements.

With regard to Deputy Clements, the District Court noted that Appellant's primary
argument in opposition to summary judgment was the contention that Deputy Clements "lied" in
his probable cause affidavit.

District Court compared the probable cause affidavit against

Plaintiffs summary of Deputy Clements' statements, and against the "lapel audio" submitted by
opposition to summary judgment.

District

1

noted

were even
young to
that he had photos of Candace, given to
lapel cam video submitted to
Court, it is
the affidavit contains no false information. Since the only allegation
Deputy Clements was that he lied on his Probable Cause Affidavit, and that
allegation is not backed by any evidence, the Plaintiff has provided no evidence
that Deputy Clements acted outside his discretion or that he provided false
information to the
County Prosecutors.
nnrunc,

Ul",<UH,:H

(R. 717) The District Court was not able to find any issue of fact created by Appellant that
Deputy Clements "lied" in his probable cause affidavit. On appeal, Appellant has not offered any
further argument

reversal of the District Court's decision

regard to Deputy Clements.

The District Court properly found that Appellant had not established a genuine issue
for trial on elements (4) and (5). The District Court found that "no
argue that there was lack of probable cause when multiple eye witness statements were
received and photographs showed the [appellant] was at the place at the time of the event, so that
opportunity to trespass existed, it is proper for the Court to determine that there was probable
cause to charge the Plaintiff with the original office." (R. 722)

Court noted that "the

only material fact that was not stipulated to is whether Deputy Clements submitted a false
probable cause affidavit, and there is no evidence supporting such an allegation." (R. 723) The
found that "the Plaintiff produced no evidence proving that
statements were unreliable or that the Jefferson County Prosecutors acted unreasonably by
relying on them." (Id.)

12

liable on a 1
investigation to

prosecuting

,.,,..,_,,,.," a charging
decision based upon her experience as a prosecuting attorney and based

the facts in the

record. Independent review by a prosecutor precludes a claim of malicious prosecution against a
police officer.
to

case, the District Court held that "Plaintiff has not provided any evidence

that Deputy Clements "falsified his affidavit"
sum,

cause. (R. 715).

Appellant did not present

level

would

establish that Deputy Clements was actuated by "malice" or that the 2011 trespass charge lacked
probable cause. Deputy Clements submitted an affidavit at the District Court level verifying that
he did not act with "malice" toward Plaintiff in regard to the investigation of the 2011 trespass.
The investigation was completed by Deputy Clements and the facts were presented to the
Prosecuting Attorney for review. The prosecutor made the decision to charge Appellant with
trespass. The independent review of the prosecutor demonstrates probable cause for the citation.
District

found that these facts

a

of malicious

that the Appellant failed to create a genuine issue of fact for trial on each required element of her
state law malicious prosecution claim.

should be dismissed as against prosecutors Robin Dunn and Amelia
Sheets.
to

Jefferson

held that they were entitled to prosecutorial immunity from Appellant's claim of malicious
prosecution.

District Court correctly held that to overcome the immunity afforded to

prosecutors, Appellant had to establish that there was a want of probable cause and that the
prosecutors acted with "malice". In Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S.
113

s.

125

209,

2606 (1993), the Court restated the application

brought against a prosecuting attorney:
We expressly stated that "the duties of the prosecutor in his role as advocate for
the state involve actions preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution and
actions apart from the courtroom." and are nonetheless entitled to absolute
immunity. . .. We have not retreated, however, from the principle that acts
undertaken by a prosecutor in pre-proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the
course of his role as an advocate for the state, are entitled to the protections of
absolute immunity. Those acts must include the professional evaluation of the
evidence assembled by the police and appropriate preparation for its presentation
at trial or before a grand jury after a decision to seek an indictment has been
made.
509 U.S. at 272-73 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Absolute immunity applies when a
prosecutor performs traditional prosecutorial functions connected with hearings, such as drafting
affidavits, selecting the information to put in them, determining whether evidence meets the

14

Conn. 2006).
,uv,,vvDrt!Sente:ato
"include

not

that the Prosecutors had evidence contradicting Deputy Clements'

probable cause affidavit or
a

witness statements, there is no genuine

of fact as to whether

Plaintiff trespassed on

suspect

r'\1"f\r1P•rh1

properly
prcise<:;ut:mg attorney

on July

cause for
a malicious

was no

claim. (Id.)
Appellant did not present any evidence at

District

that

establish

either prosecutor was actuated by "malice" or that the 2011 trespass charge lacked probable
cause.

Dunn and

each

an affidavit at the

verifying that he/she did not act with "malice" toward Plaintiff

regard to the investigation or

charging of the 2011 trespass. The investigation was completed by Deputy Clements and the
were presented to Ms. Sheets

Ms. Sheets made

to charge Appellant

with trespass. The District Court properly found that these facts preclude a claim of malicious
prosecution, and that the Appellant failed to create a genuine issue of fact for trial on each
required element of her state law malicious prosecution

15

argument that

made
agam

and by

of hearsay, that Ms. Sheets admitted to her attorney during a break in the criminal

trial that she had not viewed the evidence before charging Appellant. See, Appellant's Brief, pg.
24.
District Court correctly
genume

of fact

that Appellant had
trial against Dunn

citation to the record) that

to establish facts in the
Sheets. (R.

9) Appellant argues (without

was removed from the case by Judge Stephens,

not true. Appellant argues that

to create a

is simply

was involved in the charging decision (without citation to

the record), when the evidence before the Court is clear that Dunn assigned Sheets to handle the
the charging decision. (R. 440; 459-460)
This Court should affirm the District Court's finding with regard to Respondents Dunn
and Sheets.

16

a

Respondents on a
liability
officials cannot

law is clear

and/or supervising

vicariously liable in § I 983 claims. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social

Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Under Monell, requisite elements
municipality (or entity) are
the municipality

a § 1983 claim against a

following: ( 1) the plaintiff was deprived of a constitutional right;

entity) had a policy or custom; (3) the policy or custom amounted to

deliberate indifference to plaintiffs constitutional right; and (4) the policy or custom was the
moving force behind the constitutional violation. See Mabe v. San Bernardino County, Dep't of
Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 111
92

831, 835 (9th

1 (9th Cir. 2001)(citing Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich,

1996)(intema1 quotation marks omitted)).

District Court held that

Monell requires:
The Plaintiff must prove all of the elements outlined previously and establish that
the alleged unwritten policy be so "persistent and widespread" that it constitutes a
"permanent and well settled ... policy".
720) To be actionable, an unwritten policy or custom must

so "persistent and widespread"

that it constitutes a "permanent and well settled city policy." Monell, 436

at 691. "Liability

for improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be founded
upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency, and consistency that

17

conduct has become a

not

only convicted once." (R

Court went on:

charges brought against
were clear malicious nnlse,::utmn
cases, it most likely would not be enough to establish a persistent and widespread
policy. However, the first charge was clearly not a malicious prosecution case
because Plaintiff essentially stipulated that there was probable cause to charge her
when she submitted her Alford plea.
721)
to

District

properly held

because there was no policy or custom

these Respondents to Monell liability. On appeal, Appellant has not made any
that the District

was

findings.

should affirm the

Court's finding
Office, Sheriff Olsen, and Commissioner Raymond.

B. APPELLANT
IMPROPERLY REFERENCED MATERIALS NOT
INCLUDED IN THE RECORD ON APPEAL, AND THIS COURT MUST
IGNORE SUCH REFERENCES.
Appellant has not made a single citation to any fact in the Record on Appeal. Appellant
served
"'L'v"u'

Brief on Respondents on April 1

2016, more than a month before the Record on

was lodged with this Court-rendering it impossible for Appellant to cite to any portion

of the Record on Appeal. This Court has held that "[i]t is the responsibility of the appellant to
provide a sufficient record to substantiate his or her claims on appeal.

the absence of an

adequate record on appeal to support the appellant's claims, we will not presume error." Kugler

18

to

on

at

Court should

a

on
"Nature

the Case" section

Brief (pgs. 19-27), and

the "Brief Summary

purported facts comes
example,

Brief

a

to

"Statement

section of her

section of her

(32-33). None of

Record on Appeal.

Appellant's

is a section beginning on page 33
VL-L VHVvU

which exist in the Record on
facts.

addition, each item

vH•~--~'U

by Appellant

a list

to the record to

none
U~fJ,.,~A

her "Brief Summary

has

paraphrased and/or re-characterized by Appellant

such as fashion as to render the "fact"

completely unreliable.

on the list Appellant asserts that "Plaintiff

worked for years with the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office concerning animal welfare." This
fact is categorically untrue. Appellant never "worked for" Jefferson County in any formal or
~ v. ., ~. . .

was never an employee, contractor or volunteer

Jefferson

County. Instead, Appellant operates an animal humane society and goes about snooping over
fences in Jefferson County reporting what Appellant and Appellant alone deems to be "animal
concerns. As a result of these efforts Appellant has

19

cited on three occasions for

at

Court should ignore
to the

on

fact submitted

Appellant

fact listed on pages 1

a

1

Appellant's Brief should be excluded from consideration.
C.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AS TO ALL CLAIMS.

While Appellant has not challenged other claims dismissed by the District

at

summary judgment (neither has the Appellant challenged defenses relied upon by the District
Court in dismissing Appellant's claims) the remaining claims were properly dismissed.
example, in the Decision and Order Re: Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment the District
Court dismissed all of Appellants claims arising prior to September 16, 2012 on the basis that
any such conduct was barred by the statute of limitations. (R. 707) Appellant has not appealed
this legal ruling, and as such, it should be affirmed. This ruling is important because Appellant
has argued before this Court (without citation to the record) various facts that occurred long
before September 16, 2012. In her "Statement of Facts" section of her Brief, Appellant discusses
the first two trespass citations, both

which were resolved prior to 2011. See, Appellant's Brief,

pgs. 19-21. These arguments (and/or facts) were barred under the statute oflimitations, and
should be disregarded by this Court.

a

not appealed

as
consider
1

at

at 204;("[Appellant's]

arguments

support

record or in legal authority.

Court will not consider issues cited on appeal that are not

supported by propositions

law, authority or argument. [internal quotation omitted] Therefore,

this

declines to review these arguments.
Similarly, this

are not

upon

should decline to review other arguments raised by Appellant that
authority or factual references to

Record on Appeal.

APPELLANT DID NOT RAISE ANY ISSUE REGARDING DISCOVERY AT
THE DISTRICT COURT LEVEL.

In part
District Court erred

her "Issues Presented On Appeal", Appellant has questioned whether the
granting summary judgment "before Plaintiff had the opportunity to

depose Defendants that had already been scheduled." See, Appellant's Brief, pg. 27. This Court
has long held that "[s]ubstantive issues will not be considered for the first time on appeal.
Woods, 150 Idaho at

244 P.3d at 201; (citing Crowley v. Critchfield, 145 Idaho 509, 51

181

P.3d 435, 438 (2007)). Therefore, "[a] litigant may not remain silent as to claimed error during a
trial and later urge his objections thereto for the first time on appeal." Hoppe v. McDonald, 103
Idaho 33, 35, 644

355, 357 (1982).
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to

issuance of its ae<:1s1:on on Respondents' motion

were remedies available to Appellant to ensure that she had an opportunity to
to the

ruling, and

se litigants are

to the same standards and rules as those represented by an attorney." Twin Falls Cnty, 139 Idaho
at 445, 80 P 3d at 1046. This Court should decline to review any discovery issues as they were
not raised at the District Court level.
V.
ATTORNEY FEES
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 41, Respondents seek an award of attorney fees and
costs in accordance with Idaho Code § 12-117 and/or Idaho Code § 6-918. Section 12-117
provides for a municipal entity to recover attorney fees when "the party against whom the
judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Section 6-918 provides for
an award of costs and fees where the prevailing party demonstrates "by clear and convincing
evidence, that the party against whom or which such award is sought was guilty of bad faith in
the commencement, conduct, maintenance or defense of the action." Idaho Code Ann.§ 6-918A
(West). These sections provide that a County is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal
inasmuch the appeal has been brought frivolously, in bad faith, and without foundation in fact or
law. Case law has held that an appeal is deemed frivolous when a party fails to make a legitimate

to

m

commencement

appeal in that
not

on

has not submitted

a "legitimate showing" that

law. Attorney's fees and costs on appeal are warranted.
VI.
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Respondents respectfully request that this Court affirm the
District Court's grant of summary judgment dismissing Appellant's Complaint in its entirety,
and grant an award

Dated this

attorney's fees and costs on appeal to Respondents.

day of June, 2016.
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